Ariel Rubinstein is professor of economics at the universities of Tel Aviv and Princeton. The Faculty of Economic Sciences confers an honorary doctorate on him for his outstanding research accomplishments in economics and game theory. Rubinstein=s research on negotiation theory has provided new insights in labour economics and the theory of finance. In addition, his theoretical work has led to a better understanding of the way political coalitions are created. Rubinstein does not shy away from interdisciplinary research: he has worked on the interface between economics and law, built bridges between economics and information science, and published both on economic psychology and on language and economics
Modelling bounded rationality
Professor Ariel Rubinstein will be the first Zeuthen lecturer, a most distinguished and original researcher in economic theory. With his pathbreaking results, Ariel Rubinstein has made substantial contributions to several fields in economics, particularly game theory. His work is characterized by the combination of deep originality and surprising simplicity.
Professor Rubinstein has a background in mathematics (M.Sc.1976, Hebrew University) as well as in economics (Ph.D. 1979, Hebrew University). He has been associated with some of the world's most prestigious universities and research institutions, including Nuffield College in Oxford, Bell Laboratories, London School of Economics, and he currently holds posts at Princeton and Tel-Aviv University. He has been invited to give several international special lectures, such as the Walras-Bowley Lecture at the Econometric Society Meeting in Minnesota (1988), the CORE Lectures in Louvain-La-Neuve (1995), and the Churchil Lecture in Cambridge (1996). The Zeuthen Lectures come as a natural succession.
Until recently Ariel Rubinstein's scientific work was concentrated mainly on game theory, or the abstract theory of conflict. Probably best known are his contributions on the so-called bargaining problem, which is of fundamental importance to economics.
lt consists basically of the study of a situation of complete opposite interests between two parties,a typical example being wage negotiation. The recent Nobel laureate John Nash was concerned with the bargaining problem in some of his main writings and formulated the axiomatic bargaining theory. This problem was also at the heart of Frederik Zeuthen's work. Even after the contributions of Nash and Zeuthen it remained evident that a fully developed strategic counterpart of Nash's axiomatic theory was missing. In an important series of articles, starting with one published in Econometrica in 1982, Ariel Rubinstein formulated a coherent and elegant strategic bargaining theory and fully developed its connections to John Nash's axiomatic version.
Evidence of the originality of Ariel Rubinsteins research is bom out by his most recent contributions, which come under the heading of "economics and language" and which explain certain basic properties of everyday language.In his Zeuthen Lectures Ariel Rubinstein will analyse yet another fundamental aspect of economic theory, the assumption of rational behaviour. He will discuss ways of reiaxing this assumption instead imposing one of bounded rationality
Ariel Rubinstein Main Affiliation School of Economics , Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel 69978
Secondary Affiliation Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY, 10003, USA
Telephone +972-3-642-1111 (Home) +972-3-640-9601 (Office, TA) +1-603-388-3630 (e-Fax)
Homepage http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/
Birth Jerusalem 13/4/1951
Family Yael, Michal and Yuval.
Citizenship Israel
List of Publications:
Books
Bargaining and Markets, with M.Osborne, Academic Press 1990
The book page (corrections and updates)
A Course in Game Theory, with M.Osborne, MIT Press, 1994.
The book page (containing: table of contents, corrections and updates, solution manual, prices)
Chinese translation, China Social Sciences Publishing House, 2000.
Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, 1998.
MIT Press book page
Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
The book page
CUP book page
Chapter 5 was translated to French and published in Critique Economique N°10.Printemps été, 2003
An Edited Book
Game Theory in Economics (editor), Edward Elgar 1990.
My sincere opinion about buying this book
Articles
A note About the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule, Econometrica 47 (1979), 511-514. jstor
False Probabilistic Arguments vs. Faulty Intuition, Israel Law Review 14 (1979), 247-254. pdf
Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion Journal of Economic Theory 21 (1979), 1-9. pdf
An Optimal Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed By Accident in Applied Game Theory, ed. by S Brams, A Schotter and G Schwodiauer, Wurzberg: Physica-Verlag (1979), 406-413. pdf
A Note on the Duty of Disclosure, Economic Letters 4 (1979), 7-11. pdf science direct
Ranking the Participants in a Tournament, Journal of the Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics 38 (1980), 108-111. jstor
Strong Perfect Equilibrium in Supergames, International Journal of Game Theory 9 (1980), 1-12. pdf
Stability of Decision Under Majority Rule, Journal of Economic Theory 23 (1980), 150-159. front page
On An Anomaly of the Deterrent Effect of Punishment, Economic Letters 6 (1980), 89-94. pdf science direct
A Further Characterization of the Scores Method for Multi-Round Tournaments and Social Theory, with S.Nitzan, Public Choice 36 (1981), 153-158. front page
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 50 (1982), 97-110. jstor
Time Preference, with P.Fishburn, International Economic Review 23 (1982), 677-694.jstor
Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard, with M.E.Yaari, Journal of Economic Theory 30 (1983), 74-97.pdf
The Reasonable Man - A Social Choice Approach, Theory and Decision 15 (1983), 151-159. pdf
Repeated Two Players Game with Ruin, with R.Rosenthal, International Journal of Game Theory 14 (1984), 155-177. front page
The Single Profile Analogies to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach, International Economic Review 25 (1984), 719-730. jstor
Choice of Conjectures in a Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information, in Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining ed by A.Roth, Cambridge University Press (1985), 99-114. front page
A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1151-1172. jstor
Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining, with A.Wolinsky, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150. jstor
Algebraic Aggregation Theory, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Economic Theory 38 (1986), 63-77. front page
Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986), 83-96. pdf
A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information, with J.Ordover, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (1986), 879-888.jstor
Aggregation of Equivalence Relations, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Classification 3 (1986), 61-65. front page
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, with K.Binmore and A.Wolinsky, The Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986), 176-188.jstor
A Sequential Strategic Theory of Bargaining, in Advances in Economic Theory, ed. by T Bewley, Cambridge Press (1987), 197-224. front page
Middlemen, with A.Wolinsky, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (1987), 581-594. jstor
The Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction, in Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, Bryant and Portes (editors), MacMillan Press (1987), 17-32. front page
Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk, Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), 145-153.pdf
The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata, with D.Abreu, Econometrica 56 (1988), 1259-1282. jstor (see also Abreu-Rubinstein (1993))
Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction, in The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond, G Feiwel (editor), (1989) 243-259. pdf
Reputation and Patience in the War of Attrition, with L.Kornhauser and C.Wilson, Economica 56 (1989), 15-24.jstor
The Electronic Mail Game: A Game with Almost Common Knowledge, American Economic Review 79 (1989), 385-391.jstor
Optimal Flexibility of Rules: The Tale of the Wise Principal and the Naive Agent, European Journal of Political Economics 5 (1989) 219-227. front page
Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome, with A.Wolinsky, Review of Economic Studies 57 (1990), 63-78. jstor
On the Logic of “Agreeing to Disagree” Type Results, with A.Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory 51 (1990), 184-193. front page
New Directions in Economic Theory - Bounded Rationality Revista Espanola De Economie 7 (1990), 3-15. front page
Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory, Econometrica 59 (1991), 909-924. jstor
Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences, with A.Wolinsky, American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 600-614.jstor
On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution, with Z.Safra and W.Thomson, Econometrica, 60 (1992), 1171-1186. jstor
Noncooperative Bargaining Models, with K.Binmore and M.Osborne, Handbook of Game Theory, (Aumann and Hart editors), (1992), 179-225. front page
On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model, Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 473-484.jstor
A Subjective Perspective of the Interpretation of Economic Theory, in Making Modern Economics, The Makers of Modern Economics, vol I, A.Heertje. (ed.) (1993), 67-83. pdf
Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game, with M.Piccione, Journal of Economic Theory, 61 (1993), 160-168. science direct
Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability, with A.Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 6 (1994), 299-311. pdf
Equilibrium in Supergames in Essay in Game theory in honor of Michael Maschler, N.Meggiddo (ed.) Springer-Verlag, 1994, 17-28. front page
Remarks on Repeated Extensive Games, with A.Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 9(1995), 110-115. pdf
John Nash: The Master of Economic Modeling, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(1995), 9-13. pdf
On the Interpretation of Two Game Theoretical Models of Bargaining, in Arrow,K., Mnookin,R., Ross,L. Tversky,A. and R.Wilson (eds.) Barriers to Conflict Resolution, Norton, 1995, 120-130. front page
Why are certain Properties of Binary relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?, Econometrica, 64 (1996), 343-356. jstor
An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game, with J.Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 70 (1996), 32-42. science direct
Naive Strategies in Zero-sum Games, with A.Tversky and D.Heller, in Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, W.Guth et al. (editors), Springer-Verlag, 1996, 394-402.pdf
A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures, with C.Fershtman, Journal of Economic Theory, 72 (1997), 432-441.science direct
On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 3-24.science direct
The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 121-130.science direct
On the Question "Who is a J?": A Social Choice Approach, with A.Kasher, Logique et Analyse 160 (1997), 385-395. pdf
Games with Procedurally Rational Players, with M.Osborne, American Economic Review 88 (1998), 834-847.jstor
Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions, with J.Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 79 (1998), 157-173. science direct
Definable Preferences: An Example, European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 553-560. pdf science direct
Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point, with L. Zhou, Mathematics of Social Sciences, 37 (1999), 205-210. pdf
Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Post-class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device, Games and Economic Behavior 28 (1999), 155-170 science direct ( Better see an extended "Second Edition" )
A Theorist's View of Experiments, European Economic Review 45 (2001), 615-628. science direct pdf
Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules, with J.Glazer Games and Economic Behavior, 36 (2001), 158-173.pdf
Irrational Diversification in Multiple Decision Problems, European Economic Review, 46 (2002), 1369-1378. science direct pdf
Comments on Rationalizing Choice Functions which Violate Rationality. with Gil Kalai and Rani Spiegler, Econometrica, 70 (2002), 2481-2488. pdf
Definable Preferences: Another Example (Searching for a Boyfriend in a Foreign Town) |in "The Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science", Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Ed. by Peter Gardenfors, et al. Kluwer, 2002, vol I, 235- 243. pdf
Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns, with Michele Piccione, Journal of European Economic Association , 1 (2003), 212-223. pdf
"Economics and Psychology"? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, International Economic Review 44 (2003), 1207-1216. pdf html
Reviewed in NAJ Economics 1:1 Rejected from QJE(see rejection letter)
Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting, with Martin Osborne, Games and Economic Theory, 45 (2003), 434-441. science direct pdf
The Curse of Wealth and Power, with Michele Piccione, Journal of Economic Theory 117 (2004), 119-123. science direct pdf
On Optimal Rules of Persuasion, with Jacob Glazer, Econometrica, 72 (2004), 1715-1736. pdf
Luxury Prices: An Expositionary Note, with Michele Piccione, forthcoming in Samuelsonian Economics and the 21st Century,Ed. by Michael Szenberg pdf
Papers in Process:
Comments of on the Risk and Time Preferences in Economics, December 2001 pdf
Equilibrium in the Jungle, with Michele Piccione, 2003 pdf
Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: Response Times Study, January 2004 pdf
A Skeptic Comment on the Studies of Economics, 2004 pdf
Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist, 2004 pdf
Book Reviews:
Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, (Edited by R.M.Hograth and M.W.reder) Economica, 56 (1989), 406-7. jstor
Theory of Industrial Organization by J.Tirole: Economica, 56 (1989), 401-402. jstor
Game Theory by Fudenberg, D. and J.Tirole: Economica, 60 (1993), 245-6. jstor
Fair Division, by Steven Brams and Alan Taylor, Economics and Philosophy, 13 (1997), 113-116.
An Emipirically Based Microeconomics, by Herbert, H. Simon: Journal of Economic Literature, 37 (1999), 1711-2.pdf
The Essential John Nash, by Harold W. Kuhn and Sylvia Nasar (eds.): Times Higher Education Supplement 25 April 2003.html
The Economics of Language, by Donald M. Lamberton (ed.), The Economics Record, 79 (2003), 272-3. pdf
rariel@post.tau.ac.il
